Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, and the Real Estate Sector by Schwarcz, Steven L.
WorldEconomicForum-Oct 3, 2012 Talk.docx 
 
SHADOW BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS,  
AND THE REAL ESTATE SECTOR1 
 
Steven L. Schwarcz2 
 
 
 I. Overview of Shadow Banking 
 
 A. INTRODUCTION. The world’s financial system has been changing 
rapidly. A central feature is disintermediation: the removal of banks as 
financial intermediaries. The term “shadow banking” is often used as 
shorthand to refer to the disintermediated financial system—effectively all 
forms of financing that are not bank intermediated.  
 
 1. Examples. Shadow banking encompasses structured finance and 
securitization, in which financing is indirectly raised by special-purpose 
entities (“SPEs”). It also includes financing and financial services provided 
by other non-bank financial intermediaries—such as finance companies, 
                                                 
1 “Firestarter” talk prepared for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership 
Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate 
sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends. 
2 Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law, and 
Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center; schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I 
thank the following professionals for helpful comments on this talk: Jason Kravitt and 
Stuart Litwin of Mayer Brown LLP; Eric Marcus and Warren Bernstein of Kaye Scholer 
LLP; and Eugene Pinover of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. 
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hedge funds, money-market mutual funds, REITs,3 securities lenders 
engaging in repo lending, and investment banks.  
 
 2. Impact. The amount of non-bank intermediated (i.e., 
disintermediated) credit already “rivals” the amount of bank-intermediated 
credit to households and businesses.4 The trajectory of disintermediation 
suggests that disintermediated credit will soon, if it does not already, exceed 
bank-intermediated credit: the gross amount of disintermediated credit was 
estimated to be nearly $20 trillion in March 2008,5 but was estimated at 
three times that level—$60 trillion—in December 2011.6  
 
 3. Risks and Regulation. The paramount concern posed by the 
disintermediated financial system is that it can, if left unregulated, pose 
systemic risks to the financial system.7 Disintermediation makes it much 
more likely, for example, that market participants will engage in profitable 
but risky transactions, although doing so could externalize harm—including 
systemic harm—onto other market participants and even ordinary citizens.8 
Notwithstanding that, however, disintermediation can increase financial 
                                                 
3 Although real estate investment trusts (REITs) have long preceded what is generally 
known as shadow banking, I refer to them because they are, technically, SPEs that issue 
securities and use the proceeds to invest in real estate properties.     
4 ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, Abstract 
to SHADOW BANKING (2010).  
5 Id. at 4-5.  
6 See Philip Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 
20, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadow-
banking-idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (indicating that the shadow banking sector is a $60 
trillion industry). 
7 See, e.g., Klara Bakk-Simon et al., Shadow Banking in the Euro Area, European Central 
Bank Occasional Paper No. 133, at 4 (Apr. 2012) (observing that disintermediation is 
“one of the main sources of financial stability concerns”).   
8 See infra Part IV.C (discussing responsibility failure). See generally Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 206 (2008).  
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efficiency.9 The challenge will be to determine how shadow banking should 
be regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks.10   
 
 B. HOW WILL SHADOW BANKING IMPACT THE REAL ESTATE SECTOR? 
 
 Securitization, hedge funds, and REITs are especially relevant to the 
real estate sector.  
 
 1. Securitization is important both to the housing recovery and to 
commercial real estate generally, because it is a critical means of enabling 
mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new loans (which I 
will discuss as a means of “funding regeneration”11). A common political 
response to the recent financial crisis, however, has been to restrict 
securitization.  
 
 2. Hedge funds are becoming increasingly important as originators of 
mortgage loans, as I’ll discuss.12 
 
 3. REITs might also be regarded as part of shadow banking.13 Long 
concentrated in U.S. markets, they are becoming increasingly important in 
global real estate finance. But REITs are not significant real estate loan 
originators or funding regenerators.   
                                                 
9 Steven L. Schwarcz, Inaugural Address: Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 BOSTON 
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW 619, 624-25 (2012) (explaining why 
shadow banking “may well constitute a public good by helping to achieve efficiencies”). 
10 Id. at 641. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part II.A.2. 
13 See supra note 3. 
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 II. Funding Origination 
 
 A. MORTGAGE-LOAN ORIGINATION 
  
 1. Bank Origination. Banks are currently observing very conservative 
real estate lending standards. Regulation, such as Basel III, may well 
motivate banks to continue observing conservative real estate lending 
standards.    
 
 2. Non-Bank Origination. When banks observe conservative lending 
standards voluntarily or pursuant to regulation that applies only to banks 
(qua banks), that provides an opportunity for non-banks to begin competing 
in real estate loan origination. For example, hedge funds—directly or 
through vehicles (SPEs) that issue securities to raise financing—are now 
originating a significant amount of commercial real estate lending in the 
United States. I also understand that hedge funds are actively engaged in 
acquiring residential mortgage-origination and servicing businesses, which 
they expect to be increasingly profitable.  
 
 3. Government Roles in Mortgage-Loan Origination. 
  
 (i) Governments worldwide are increasingly considering restricting 
residential mortgage-loan origination standards. Overly restrictive 
origination standards could, of course, impede the housing recovery.  
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 (ii) In the United States, for example, mortgage lending will be 
strongly driven by what is known as the Qualified Mortgage (QM) definition 
for making mortgage loans. This definitional limitation is mandated by § 
1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amends the Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit a lender from making a residential mortgage loan unless the lender 
“makes a reasonable and good faith determination . . . that the consumer has 
a reasonable ability to repay the loan.”14  
 
 Until the definition is finalized, parties cannot estimate credit cost or 
availability. This contributes to the conundrum that although today’s low 
interest rates and home prices should make housing very affordable, many 
ordinary families can’t qualify for mortgage loans. Furthermore, the final 
QM definition will strongly impact the availability and cost of credit because 
borrowers will have strong incentives to litigate mortgage loans that, in 
retrospect, arguably fall outside that definition. Under proposed law, for 
example, an ability-to-repay violation would be a defense against 
foreclosure; and a lender losing an ability-to-repay lawsuit becomes subject 
to “enhanced damages,” which include liability for actual damages, double 
finance charges, and all costs. Attempts to finalize the QM definition thus 
face an inherent tension between protecting borrowers while ensuring 
reasonable credit availability.  
 
 One way to help resolve that tension would be to allow a definitional 
alternative option for a QM loan, based on the loan-to-value ratio. For 
                                                 
14 In April 2011, the Federal Reserve Board delegated its issuance authority to its 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which issued a proposed rule amending 
Regulation Z. Under that proposal, a QM loan would require that several specific 
underwriting factors be considered and verified. 
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example, there could be a non-exclusive regulatory safe harbor if the 
collateral value is at least 1.X times the loan principal. This would be 
somewhat analogous to Regulation U of the Federal Reserve, requiring 
margin loans secured by margin stock to be collateralized at least 2:1.15 I am 
not suggesting, however, that real estate loans need as much 
overcollateralization as margin loans. I understand that residential mortgage 
loans in Canada, for example, are keyed to only an 80% maximum loan-to-
value ratio. 
 
 (iii) The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may be 
considering further proactively regulating mortgage origination in the United 
States. Also, there are worldwide regulatory efforts to impose restrictions 
and safety nets for mortgage loans.   
 
 (iv) Government may have other roles in mortgage origination—
subject to the caveat that any government role would, of course, affect 
private market incentives. Should governments consider, for example, 
providing mortgage-loan guarantees, perhaps for early mortgage years, 
much as they do for project financing (especially during the risky 
construction phase)? Should governments consider making credit available 
to mortgage-loan originators to enhance the liquidity of key real estate 
markets?16 Also, given the very long-term nature of typical mortgage loans, 
what will be the impact of Basel III’s aversion to short-term “wholesale” 
funding to finance loan/asset books? Will mortgage loans be made for 
                                                 
15 It is only somewhat analogous because, unlike Regulation U, the definitional 
alternative option for a QM loan would be non-exclusive. 
16 In that regard, compare the role of Federal Home Loan Banks in the United States. 
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shorter periods? That may be done already in certain countries, and that 
could help to mitigate lending risk (although it increases borrower risk). 
 
 B. ALTERNATIVES TO MORTGAGE LOANS 
 
 1. Alternative Forms of Access. To what extent will restricted loan 
origination motivate alternative forms of “access”—such as leasing and 
other non-ownership rights to use real property? Leasing is important in 
some non-U.S. markets; and since the financial crisis, leasing of residential 
real estate has become increasing important in the U.S. 
 
 2. Rental Payments as Financial Assets. As alternative forms of 
access grow, one can envision regenerating funding through securitization 
(see below). Lease rental payments, for example, are “financial assets,” and 
at least theoretically all types of financial assets can be securitized.  
 
 
 III. Funding Regeneration 
  
 A. SECURITIZATION 
 
 Recall that securitization is important to the housing recovery as well 
as to commercial real estate because it is a critical means of enabling 
mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new loans.17 For 
example, a mortgage-loan originator that makes $X of mortgage loans can 
securitize the loans and regain close to $X of liquidity to make additional 
                                                 
17 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.      
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loans. And the additional loans can likewise be securitized, enabling the 
mortgage-loan originator to make further additional loans. The cycle can 
continue, perhaps enabling a mortgage-loan originator starting with $X to 
make, for example, three or four times that amount of loans per year.    
 
 1. GSE Securitization.  Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) 
securitization is currently the primary domestic source of funding 
regeneration, through monetization of mortgage loans. To some extent, this 
is driven by regulation: the Dodd-Frank Act, for example, imposes a 5% 
minimum unhedged risk-retention (“skin in the game”) requirement for non-
GSE mortgage-loan securitizations.18 To that extent, GSE securitization is 
incongruous because it is inconsistent with the goal of the Obama 
administration’s white paper on housing finance, of phasing out the GSEs 
and enticing more “private capital” into the system.  
 
 To some extent, however, GSE securitization reflects a post-financial 
crisis move to safety.19 As later discussed, however, there may be a trend in 
today’s financial markets toward increasing tolerance for risk.20   
                                                 
18 Risk Retention ties into the Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) rule because the 
risk-retention requirement does not apply to securitizing QRMs. Six federal agencies are 
jointly responsible for issuing this rule. QRMs are to be a higher quality subset of 
Qualified Mortgage (QM) loans. On March 11, 2011, the six agencies proposed a very 
tight QRM definition. There has been no subsequent release as to when a final rule will 
be issued. 
19 Thus, Ginnie Mae, which is wholly-owned by the U.S. government, has grown even 
more important as compared to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Foreign investors often 
prefer Ginnie Mae securities because they are backed by a full U.S. government 
guarantee. Even though the yields on Ginnie Mae securities are lower than on Fannie and 
Freddie securities, investors are concerned about Fannie and Freddie because they are 
private entities (albeit “federally chartered” or “government sponsored”), having only a 
line of credit to the U.S. Treasury. 
20 See infra Part IV.A.2..  
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 2. Non-GSE Securitization. It is hard to predict the future of the 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market. However, until that 
market is weaned from the GSEs, the level of residential real estate 
financing may be limited.  
 
 B. COVERED BONDS 
 
 1. Covered bonds can also serve, similar to securitization, as a way to 
monetize mortgage loans.21 Some covered bond regimes are statutory, some 
are contractual. Statutory regimes are generally safer for investors because 
they provide legislative safe harbors. The United States does not yet have a 
statutory covered bond law.  
 
 2. The relationships and differences between securitization and 
covered bonds are complex. Although covered bonds are sometimes viewed 
by investors as preferable to securitization, covered bonds are more likely 
than securitization to harm unsecured creditors of mortgage-loan 
originators.22 
 
 
 IV. Controlling Future Real Estate Financing Risk 
 
                                                 
21 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 THE 
BUSINESS LAWYER 561 (2011).  
22 See id. at 586. 
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 No matter how funding origination and funding regeneration are 
regulated, there are likely to be future financial failures. That is because 
shadow banking can trigger three types of market failures, which regulation 
can only address imperfectly: information failure, agency failure, and 
responsibility failure (often addressed as externalities). 
  
 A. INFORMATION FAILURE  
 
 1. Asymmetric Information. By increasing complexity, shadow 
banking can cause information failure by making financial transactions and 
products more difficult to disclose and understand. In the recent financial 
crisis, for example, it appears that neither investors nor even underwriters 
always fully understood and appreciated the potential consequences of 
complex, highly-leveraged ABS CDO securities, which were largely payable 
from securities that themselves were payable from underlying mortgage 
loans.  
 
 2. Bounded Rationality. Although sometimes categorized separately, 
this can be viewed as a subset of information failure.  
 
 (i) We have difficulty, for example, appreciating unlikely events that, 
if they occur, could have devastating consequences.23 In this context, note 
the parallel between subprime margin loans as a causal factor in the Great 
Depression (when the rising stock market collapsed, many of these loans 
became undercollateralized), and subprime mortgage loans as a causal factor 
                                                 
23 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1349, 1366-68 (2011). 
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in the recent financial crisis (when the rising housing market collapsed, 
many of these loans likewise became undercollateralized). In both cases, 
observers critically under-appreciated the systemic consequences of a 
precipitous drop—unprecedented in then-recent history—in collateral value.  
 
 (ii) We also have short memories. Although in late 2008/early 2009, 
no investor would buy anything that did not have a government guarantee, 
there is a trend in today’s financial markets toward increasing tolerance for 
risk. To obtain higher returns, investors—especially hedge funds—are now 
buying AAA/Aaa subprime auto and A-rated prime auto paper and are 
looking at other asset classes. We now appear to have a vibrant CLO market 
for non-mortgage asset classes (which looks in all respects like the old CDO 
market with just a different name).24 Even CMBS is improving, though 
RMBS is still uncertain.25  
 
 Short memories, however, may not fully explain risk cycles and 
today’s market’s increasing tolerance for risk. Other explanations might 
include a swing back to normalcy from the earlier overreaction, and a 
competitive need of investors to get high returns.26 
 
 B. AGENCY FAILURE 
 
                                                 
24 E-mail from Stuart Litwin, partner, Mayer Brown LLP, to the author (Sep. 10, 2012).  
25 Id. 
26 Litwin also observes that governments worldwide have made it an economic policy to 
keep interest rates low to stimulate their economies and economic troubles have 
dramatically increased the demand for low-risk government securities. Short-term, 
AAA/Aaa-rated, ABS has a somewhat greater return than—and has become a reasonable 
substitute for—other low risk investments. Id.  
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 1. By increasing complexity, shadow banking can increase the 
potential for agency failure (meaning principal-agent failure, as opposed to 
GSE “agency” failure).  
 
 2. The biggest problem may not be the traditional agency conflict 
between a firm’s owners and senior managers but, instead, the conflict 
between a firm’s senior managers and its secondary managers (such as vice 
presidents and analysts).27 Because secondary managers are typically paid 
on a short-term basis, including yearly bonuses, and they often move from 
firm to firm, their interests do not necessarily align with the long-term 
interests of their firms. Even more apropos to shadow banking, secondary 
managers may well have a better technical understanding of complex 
investments and transactions, so they can—and in the recent financial crisis, 
often likely did—recommend investments and transactions that generate 
high returns, and thus high bonuses to them, even though the investments 
and transactions pose real long-term risks to their firms.28   
 
 3. Agency failure is, theoretically, one of the easiest types of failure to 
try to manage by regulation.29 But to the extent managers can move to jobs 
in different countries, effective regulation will require international 
governmental cooperation.   
 
 C. RESPONSIBILITY FAILURE 
                                                 
27 Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 457 (2009). 
28 Id. (discussing how secondary managers used VaR to accomplish this). 
29 Id. at 465-69 (discussing possible solutions, including aligning compensation 
incentives). 
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 1. Shadow banking also makes it much more likely that market 
participants will engage in profitable but risky transactions, although doing 
so could externalize harm—including systemic harm—onto other market 
participants and even ordinary citizens. Economists would see this as fitting 
into the traditional market-failure category of “externalities.”  
 
 2. “Externalities,” however, is a counterintuitive and confusing term 
for a market-failure category because it conflates cause and effect. 
Externalities are consequences, not causes, of market failure. We need to 
focus more on the cause of those externalities, which I will call 
responsibility failure.30 
 
 3. For example, limited liability is an important source of 
responsibility failure that can lead to externalities. Because investors in firms 
are not personally liable for liabilities of their firms, the interests of investors 
may conflict with the interests of their firms and, more importantly for 
externalities, with the interests of third parties harmed by their firms.31 
 
 4. By facilitating decentralization, shadow banking makes this form of 
responsibility failure much more likely. The relatively small firms that 
operate in the disintermediated financial system are often managed directly 
                                                 
30 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Disintermediation and the Need 
for a Common Language (work-in-progress), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2159455 (explaining and developing the concept of 
responsibility failure). 
31 This is not an overlap with agency failure because agency failure goes to the principal-
agent relationship whereas conflicts resulting from limited liability go to the conflict 
between managers of firms and society. 
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by their primary investors. Because they typically divide up a significant 
share of the firm’s profits, those managers have strong incentives to take 
risks that could generate large profits. Yet if a risky action exposes their firm 
to significant liability for externalized harm, those managers would not be 
liable if the firm cannot pay that liability. They therefore have an incentive 
to take outsized risks with their firms, for the chance of outsized gains to 
themselves, notwithstanding the potential systemic impact that could result 
from their firm’s failure.32  
 
 5. This is radically unlike the management incentives in large firms, 
such as traditional banks, in which the senior managers tend to share only 
indirectly in profits, such as through stock options. Those managers may 
also be more invested in maintaining their jobs. They therefore are less 
motivated to take actions that risk the firm.    
 
                                                 
32 To some extent this would be balanced, however, by the failure of a relatively small 
firm being less likely to trigger systemic consequences than the failure of a larger firm. 
